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The Controversial Status of International and Comparative 
Law in the United States * 
 
 
 
Martha Minow† 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, I have watched the swirling debate over whether the United 
States courts should consult international or comparative law.  As a law professor, the 
debate has puzzled me, for international and comparative legal materials have always 
appeared in the sources consulted by American lawyers and judges.  So this article is 
really a search for the roots of the contemporary controversy.  Why is there a 
controversy? And what can we learn from it? 
I will suggest three conjectures to explain the fact of the contemporary debate 
over the proper role of international law within the United States: 
(1) a basic concern emphasizes that we risk being taken over, or losing what we 
are by engaging with others; 
(2) a second worry stresses that the United States is exceptional and thus faces 
politically motivated attacks as the last superpower; 
(3) a third very specific trepidation arises from the unusual nature of “customary 
international law.”     
My hope is that by locating the sources of the controversy over the place of 
international law within the United States, we can dismiss artificial issues and focus on 
genuine and significant developments—broader changes that offer a window onto the 
prospects for more effective human governance.  The debate diverts attention from 
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developments that might be instructive to us not just in what US courts do but, more 
importantly, in how we design legislation and legal institutions and how we 
understand our place in the world. 
First, we need to see the puzzle: what is the contemporary debate and how does it 
relate to judicial practice in the United States? 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE AND THE PUZZLE 
Here is the puzzle: no one disagrees that United States judges have long consulted 
and referred to materials from other countries as well as international sources; yet for 
the past nine or so years, citing foreign and international sources has provoked 
intense controversy. 
The evidence of the longstanding practice is undisputed and well-forecast by one 
of the Federalist Papers, which asserted, “attention to the judgment of other nations 
is important to every government” as a matter of foreign policy and also as a check on 
“strong passion or momentary interest” within the nation.1  The U.S. Constitution 
itself accords to Congress the authority to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”2  Citations to 
foreign law appear in Supreme Court opinions from 1823 (dealing with Native 
Americans),3 1832 (defining the status of Indian tribes)4, 1877 (concerning personal 
jurisdiction),5 and 1879 (rejecting polygamy)6.  In 1900, the Supreme Court ruled that 
“international law is part of our law.”7  Justices on the Supreme Court have consulted 
and referred to the laws of other nations in addressing slavery,8 mandatory 
vaccinations,9 regulation of wheat markets,10 emergency governmental powers,11 the 
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment,12 rights upon arrest,13 abortion,14 
                                                 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison).  See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *67 (stating that the common law adopts the law of nations). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
3 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574–85, 592–96 (1823). 
4 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551–552 (1832). 
5 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729–30 (1877). 
6 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–65 (1879). 
7 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  See also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. 64, 80 (1804) (Chief Justice Marshall agreed with the complainant that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains”). 
8 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407–08, 451 (1857). 
9 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–32 (1905). 
10 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125–26 (1942). 
11 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 651–52 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
12 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958). 
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486–87 (1966) 
14 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 136–38 (1973). 
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sodomy,15 and end-of-life treatment.16  Judge Frank Easterbrook reviewed the use of 
foreign sources by U.S. courts and concluded that the practice “has been stable for a 
long time; any suggestion that the practice has skyrocketed recently is unfounded.”17 
Others have noted that consideration by U.S. judges of decisions or practices 
from other countries and international bodies is fundamentally no different than 
references to law review articles, materials from state courts, or Shakespeare, in that 
each is “filtered through the analytical machinery of a U.S. court” and treated not as 
binding but merely as potentially instructive.18 
Whether identified as foreign law, international law, or comparative law, what if 
any role should legal materials originating from outside domestic U.S. practice play 
inside the legal system of this country?  It is worth noting at the outset that the 
discussion tends to merge these categories—international and comparative law—
although all that they share is “not U.S. in origin.”  Let me flag for later emphasis: 
where international law does have endorsement by the United States, then it too is U.S. 
law.  Although this point gets obscured, let us acknowledge that the debate sweeps in 
consultation of constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions from other countries, as 
well as international treaties we have not signed, international treaties we have signed, 
and other sources of international law. 
Current members of the U.S. Supreme Court advance the most visible edge of 
the contemporary debate over this issue.  When Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court give public speeches, they seldom replay fights internal to the Court on the 
results of particular cases, but more commonly explore disagreements about methods 
of interpretation and the roles of judges and the judiciary.    
During his Senate confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts objected to 
reference to international law by U.S. courts because international law “doesn’t limit 
[judges’] discretion the way relying on domestic precedent does,” and consulting how 
other countries treat particular legal questions pending in the United States is like 
“looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.”19  During his own 
confirmation hearing, Justice Samuel Alito emphasized that “The Framers [of the 
United States Constitution] did not want Americans to have the rights of people in 
France or the rights of people in Russia, or any of the other countries on the 
                                                 
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
16 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997).  See generally Steven G. Calebresi 
& Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of 
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
17 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreign Sources and the American Constitution, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 223, 223 (2006). 
18 Chimène I. Keitner, International and Foreign Law Sources: Siren Song for U.S. Judges?, 3 
ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS 215 (2009).  See also Easterbrook, supra note 17 (cautioning 
against citation of any sources to support judicially-announced changes in the Constitution or 
national law). 
19 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 201 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. 
Roberts, Jr.). 
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continent of Europe at the time.  They wanted them to have the rights of Americans, 
and . . . I don’t think it’s appropriate to look to foreign law.”20 
Justice Thomas wrote concurring in a denial of certiorari, “While Congress, as a 
legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or 
fashions on Americans.”21  In a 2004 opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia chided fellow 
Justices for inviting implying that the “law of nations,” which he described as 
“redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject,” could ever bind citizens in 
our territory because, he wrote, this idea is “a 20th-century invention of 
internationalist law professors and human rights advocates”22 and is inconsistent with 
both the understanding of our Constitution’s framers and democracy.  Scalia viewed 
international human rights law to be “a fantasy.”23  In another recent opinion, Justice 
Scalia objected to the citation of the laws of other nations as irrelevant and 
inconsistent, and also noted that that “‘[a]cknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no 
place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s 
judgment—which is surely what it parades as today.”24   
Some members of Congress decided to join the fray and even suggested censure 
or impeachment of a judge who cites non-U.S. sources.25  Members of Congress have 
repeatedly introduced resolutions such as this one: “judicial interpretations regarding 
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or 
in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such 
foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the Constitution of the United States.”26  Senator John Cornyn introduced 
this resolution into the Senate by warning that a trend of citing foreign decisions, if 
real, would mean that “the American people may be losing control over the meaning 
of our laws and of our Constitution.  If this trend continues, foreign governments 
may even begin to dictate what our laws and our Constitution mean, and what our 
policies in America should be.”27  During the Senate confirmation hearings for Justice 
Elena Kagan, Senator Jon Kyl said he was troubled by the suggestion “you can turn to 
foreign law to get good ideas.”28  Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 
                                                 
20 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) 
(statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito). 
21 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).  
22 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749–50 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
23 Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 273, 310 (2006). 
24 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
25 See Judicial Conduct Act of 2007, H.R. 2898, 110th Cong. (2007); Dana Milbank, And the 
Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3. 
26 H.R. Res. 372, 110th Cong. (2007); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). 
27 151 CONG. REC. S3109 (daily ed. March 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn).   
28 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (June 30, 2010). 
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objected that foreign legal sources should not be used in U.S. courts because their 
authors “are not accountable to the American people.”29  In sum, critics charge that 
references to non-U.S. sources by American judges can be selective, faddish, and 
cover for the judges’ own unaccountable views, or a departure from American 
democracy and authority. 
When it comes to keeping Congress out of their business, perhaps all the Justices 
could agree.  Hence, Justice Scalia in a speech in 2006 declared, “As much as I think 
that it is improper to use foreign law to determine the meaning of the Constitution, I 
don’t think it’s any of [Congress’s] business.”30   
But on the place of foreign and international law within U.S. law, Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Kennedy have diverged from the views already described.  Justice 
Breyer does not only refer to foreign and international legal sources,31 he also 
emphatically defends this practice, noting: 
 
[W]hen I do read things, I can read what I want.  If I see something 
written by a man or a woman who has a job like mine in another 
country, and who is interpreting a document somewhat like mine 
and who in fact has a problem in front of the court somewhat like 
mine, why can’t I read it, see what they’ve done? I might learn 
something.32 
 
Justice Breyer has asserted that international law importantly reflects a 
globalization of human rights and “near-universal desire for judicial institutions that, 
through guarantees of fair treatment, help to provide the security necessary for 
investment and, in turn, economic prosperity.”33  Foreign governmental responses, in 
his view, may “cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a 
common legal problem.”34  Justice Breyer has also commented: “I know it’s not 
binding,” when the authority comes from outside the United States, and, in his words, 
“so what’s the problem?”35 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly has commented that “Judges in the United 
States are free to consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Treatises, what 
law professors or even law students write copiously in law reviews . . . why not the 
                                                 
29 Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at George Mason University (Oct. 18, 2005) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_051018.html). 
30 Scalia Criticizes Use of Foreign Law in Interpreting U.S. Constitution, FOX NEWS, May 18, 2006, 
available at http://www.foxnews/com/story/0,2933,196114,00.html. 
31 See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 120 S.Ct. 459, 462–463 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (mem.) 
(citing decisions from Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, and the European Court of Human Rights). 
32 Jesse J. Holland, Justice Breyer Says Debate Over Foreign Law is Irrelevant, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Apr. 2, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PrintFriendly.jsp?id=1202447364424. 
33 Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address: The Supreme Court And The New International 
Law, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003). 
34 Id. at 266. 
35 Holland, supra note 32. 
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analysis of a question similar to one we confront contained in an opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the German 
Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights?”36  More 
controversially, she has stated, “We are losers if we neglect what others can tell us 
about endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged 
groups.”37  Indeed, she stresses that lack of engagement with foreign decisions has 
reduced the influence of the Supreme Court.38  Following the Senate confirmation 
hearings for Justice Kagan, Justice Ginsburg speech stressed, “The U.S. judicial 
system will be the poorer, I have urged, if we do not both share our experience with, 
and learn from, legal systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to 
our own.”39  Citing reference to foreign opinion or law by the authors of the 
Declaration of Independence, the authors of the Federalist Papers, and by Supreme 
Court opinions, Justice Ginburg predicted that the U.S. Supreme Court will continue 
to accord “a ‘decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind’ as a matter of comity 
and in a spirit of humility.”40 
Justice Anthony Kennedy previously objected to the idea that judgments from 
foreign constitutional courts could contribute to the development of American 
constitutional law, but in recent years he has cited foreign sources in key opinions.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, invalidating Texas’ sodomy statute, Justice Kennedy pointed to the 
decriminalization of sodomy by the British Parliament in 1967, the European 
Convention on Human rights, and a 1981 European Court of Human Rights 
decision.41  In Roper v. Simmons, explaining the Court’s rejection of the death penalty 
applied to a crime committed by a minor, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause included consideration of “the 
world community” as providing “respected and significant confirmation for our own 
                                                 
36 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa: “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: 
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-
07b-06.html). 
37 Breyer, supra note 33 (quoting Ginsburg, J.). 
38 Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14. 
39 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the 
International Academy of Comparative Law, American University: “A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of [Human]kind”:  The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication (July 30, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-02-
10.html).  Noting how the framers set the “high importance” of observing the “laws of 
nations,” Justice Ginsburg reiterated Elena Kagan’s position that foreign opinions “set no 
binding precedent for the U.S. judge.  But they can add to the store of knowledge relevant to 
the solution of trying questions.”  Id. 
40
 Id. 
41 539 U.S. at 572–73. 
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conclusions.”42  Justice Kennedy added, “It does not lessen fidelity to the 
Constitution . . . to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental 
rights by other nations and peoples underscores the centrality of those same rights 
within our own heritage of freedom.”43 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor has also supported “broader consideration of foreign 
and international law in U.S. judicial opinions,”44 and in 2009 in a speech stated, “to 
the extent that we have freedom of ideas, international law and foreign law will be 
very important in the discussion of how to think about the unsettled issues in our 
legal system,”45 though she has also maintained that such sources have “very limited 
formal force” and she joins Justices Scalia and Thomas in warning of selection bias in 
the use of international legal sources.46  While on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor at times supported judicial consultation of 
decisions of other constitutional courts outside the United States.47 
Yet since 2003, a serious political as well as theoretical fight over judicial 
reference by U.S. judges to non-U.S. sources has broken out in the opinions of 
Supreme Court Justices, on the lecture circuit, in law reviews, and in Congress.  
Intensity of feeling around these debates should not be underestimated.  Justice 
Ginsburg reported a death threat was posted on a website in 2005 against both her 
and Justice O’Connor in reference to their discussions of international law in the 
                                                 
42 543 U.S. at 578. 
43 Id. 
44 Collin Levy, Op-Ed., Sotomayor and International Law, WALL. ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A13. 
45 Steven Groves, Questions for Justice Sotomayor on the Use of Foreign and International Law, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, July 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/Questions-for-Judge-Sotomayor-on-
the-Use-of-Foreign-and-International-Law at note 12 and accompanying text (quoting speech 
by Sotomayor, J. to the ACLU in Puerto Rico). 
46 Id. 
47 See William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts – Comparative Remarks, in 14 GERMANY AND ITS 
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE –TURERERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 
(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“now that constitutional law is solidly 
grounded in so many countries,  it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the 
decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative processes”); SANDRA 
DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
234 (2003) (“As the American model of judicial review of legislation spreads further around 
the globe, I think that we Supreme Court Justices will find ourselves looking more frequently 
to the decisions of other constitutional courts, especially other common-law courts that have 
struggled with the same basic constitutional questions that we have: equal protection, due 
process, the Rule of Law in constitutional democracies. . . . All of these courts have something 
to teach us about the civilizing function of constitutional law.”). On the bench, however, in 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “if it is evidence of a 
national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are 
not relevant.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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context of judicial decision-making.48  Justice Ginsburg cautioned that the 
congressional debates seemed to “fuel the irrational fringe.”49 
II. WHY THE BIG FIGHT? 
A. FEAR OF BEING TAKEN OVER AND LOSING CONTROL 
Senator Cornyn offered a cogent explanation of the first source of the fight over 
turning to foreign law: a basic concern about identity and autonomy—that we risk 
being taken over and losing what we are by engaging with others.  This concern 
squarely hits the use of comparative law, the law of Germany, Canada, South Africa, 
Israel, or other countries, rather than consultation of international law, though that, 
too, could raise similar worries.  There is an obvious intersection between this set of 
concerns and debates over judicial interpretation and constitutional construction.  
Justice Scalia, for example, is explicit in his advocacy of “originalism,” directing judges 
to construe the United States Constitution to discern the meaning of its drafters.  
Justice Scalia connects this method to his resistance to foreign sources in noting, “the 
men who founded our republic did not aspire to emulate Europeans, much less the 
rest of the world . . . and nothing has changed.”50  Justice Breyer emphasizes, in 
contrast, that the Declaration of Independence itself points to a “decent respect to 
the opinions of mankind,”51 and Justice Breyer has articulated a philosophy of judicial 
interpretation that pursues the underlying values of fostering democracy and the well-
being of citizens.52 
For Senator Cornyn and others, U.S. judges risk losing tight adherence to strictly 
U.S. text and values if they consult the laws or decisions of other nations to construe 
terms within the U.S. Constitution.  Attacks against consideration of foreign sources 
can reflect not only concerns about confining judges to the views held by the 
Constitution’s framers but also disagreements over the results in cases like Lawrence v. 
Texas—striking down a statute criminalizing sodomy—and Roper v. Simmons—
rejecting the death penalty applied to a crime committed by a minor.  An author 
posting on the National Review website comments that this consultation of foreign 
and international law to assist interpretation of the U.S. Constitution could allow a 
judge to “reach the result he wants to reach” with no restrictions, and with the effect 
                                                 
48 See Bill Mears, Justice Ginsburg Details Death Threat, CNN, Mar. 15, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/15/scotus.threat. 
49 Id. 
50 Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks at the 
American Enterprise Institute on the Role that International and Foreign Law Should Play in 
American Judicial Decision-Making (Feb. 21, 2006) (transcript available from CQ 
Transcriptions). 
51 Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232. 
52 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005). 
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of “depriving American citizens of their powers of representative government by 
selectively imposing on them favored policies of Europe’s leftist elites.”53  As no one 
argues that foreign sources are in any way binding on the United States, the objection 
merely to consulting them is thus often simply part of the critique of the outcomes.  
Yet there is another worry about the consultation of foreign sources that seems to 
operate at a psychological or sociological level of concern.  The sheer act of looking at 
decisions or opinions from non-U.S. sources is the apparent problem—so why?  
There seems to be a fear of temptation or loss of control.  If merely looking at what 
others are doing causes the worry, the concern seems to be about caving to peer 
pressure or being an outlier—some kind of contagion effect.  Justice Breyer must 
sense this objection for he responds, “comparative use of foreign constitutional 
decisions will not lead us blindly to follow the foreign court,” and “of course, we are 
interpreting our own Constitution . . . and there may be relevant political and 
structural differences between their systems and our own.”54 
This recognition of differences offers a response to the fear that our judges will 
be contaminated, unable to resist, or taken over if they consult constitutional materials 
from other countries.  The assumption that looking at what others do leads to 
following them neglects the genuine possibility that looking at others will lead to 
greater conviction about remaining different or to increased clarity about the reasons 
for going a different way.  As Professor Vicki Jackson at Georgetown University Law 
Center emphasizes, the process of engagement with comparative materials is as likely 
to help American judges clarify what is not consistent with the text and traditions of 
the United States as it is to be instructive in interpreting American commitments.55  
For example, in viewing the treatment of hate speech in Canada and Germany, where 
courts have upheld and applied restrictions, analysis of the American constitutional 
tradition rejects the path pursued elsewhere as disconnected from our text and 
commitments, as well as reflective of different contexts and concerns.56  Looking at 
what others do may sharpen our sense of our differences rather than produce a sense 
of pressure to conform. 
This reminds me of the critical lesson my mother taught my sisters and me. As 
my sister Nell explained recently: 
                                                 
53 Ed Whelan, Obama Supreme Court Candidate Harold Koh—Part 1, BENCH MEMOS, NATIONAL 
REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-
memos/50710/obama-supreme-court-candidate-harold-koh-mdash-part-1/ed-whelan 
(criticizing judicial transnationalism as interpreted in Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law 
Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 749–50 (2006)). 
54 Breyer, supra note 33, at 266 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
55 VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 115 
(2009); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).  
56 RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE 51–52, 137–38 (2006); Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 32–38 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
See also Doe v. Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 860–67 (E.D. Mich 1989) (discussing the various 
restrictions on free speech allowed by U.S. Courts under the First Amendment).   
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One of the greatest gifts my mother ever gave me was when I was 
in kindergarten and I told her that everyone else was allowed to go 
to a friend’s house after school without getting permission first 
except me.  She said, “Now is a good time for you to learn that that 
reason will never work in our family.  If there’s a reason that 
something is right for us, I want to hear about it.  But what 
everyone else is doing is never a reason for us to do it.”57 
 
My sister reflected:  
 
What an utterly liberating idea.  I never thought about trying to be 
like everyone else again.  Now that backfired a little on my mother 
when she tried to tell me that everyone else wears shoes at their 
wedding, but other than that, we’ve both been very happy with it.58 
 
I do not mean to minimize concerns about peer pressure or influence but instead 
to emphasize that confidence in who we are, what our values and traditions are, and 
how we interpret them over time stems from a source deeper than a refusal to look at 
what others do. 
B. DEFENSE OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
Announcement of American difference, however, is a further reason for the 
resistance to judicial consideration of foreign or international sources.  The view of 
American uniqueness has roots in ideas from the Puritans, ideals of the Revolution, 
comments by observers like Alexis de Tocqueville,59 and visions of leaders like 
Abraham Lincoln, whose Gettysburg Address locates America as a nation “conceived 
in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”60  After the 
fall of the Soviet Union, American exceptionalism also became associated with 
recognition of the nation as the last superpower, and some have argued that as the 
United States has been expected to play—and is often playing—the leading role in 
many international affairs, this country should be understood as an “exception” to the 
                                                 
57 Nell Minow, Sermon delivered at Beth El Hebrew Congregation, Alexandra, Virginia 4 (Apr. 
30, 2010) (transcript on file with the Harvard International Law Journal). 
58 Id. 
59 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve 
trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1987) (1831). 
60 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) in 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Ray P. Basler ed., 1953).  See also SEYMOUR 
MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 31 (1997) (“G. K. 
Chesterton put it: ‘America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed.  That 
creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of 
Independence. . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
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law of nations.  Some make this claim affirmatively and others do so critically.61  In 
this context, reference to international law in decisions by American judges can be 
fraught with political charge, especially if it seems to signal adherence to international 
documents outside the official process of treaty agreement involving the Congress 
and the President. 
For some, reference to foreign sources in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five-
Justice majority striking down the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles in 
Roper v. Simmons is especially controversial because even the majority acknowledged 
that “when the Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
. . . it did so subject to the President’s proposed reservation regarding Article 6(5) of 
that treaty, which prohibits capital punishment for juveniles.”62  Justice Kennedy’s 
consideration of practices by other nations thus, to some, looked like an end run 
around that treaty process.  It is worth noting, however, that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion expressly interprets United States law, namely, the “cruel and unusual 
punishment” language in the Eighth Amendment of our Constitution, and considers 
foreign practice only alongside practices within our states and expert opinions within 
the United States as data to assess, as our Eighth Amendment directs, whether 
punishment is “cruel and unusual.”63  The relevance of the law of other nations is 
only as provided by United States law that itself directs judges to consider what is or 
has become “cruel and unusual.” 
The issue of American exceptionalism arises additionally with regard to 
international legal sources, and the clear rule is that the United States is bound by 
international law when that law has been duly incorporated into U.S. law, pursuant to 
our own procedures for doing so.  One of the treaties we have not signed establishes 
the International Criminal Court (technically: President Bill Clinton signed the 
governing Rome Statute, President George Bush “unsigned” it, and Congress has 
never ratified it).64  U.S. critics assail this court—empowered to investigate and 
prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide—as an infringement of 
national sovereignty, as operating with vague and unaccountable power, and as 
subject to politically motivated prosecutions.65  It does pose the unusual feature that 
even nations that have not signed onto the court could face prosecutions if the 
situation involving an alleged international crime within the court’s jurisdiction is 
referred to the ICC prosecutor by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Discussion among Neal K. Katyal, Michael S. Paulsen, David B. Rivkin, Jr., Nadine 
Strossen, and Steven G. Calabresi, The Federalist Society, American Exceptionalism, the War 
on Terror and the Rule of Law in the Islamic World (Nov. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.460/pub_detail.asp; AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).  
62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. 
63 Id. at 276–78. 
64 See Braced for the Aftershock, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2009, at 66. 
65 John Bolton, Speech Two: Reject and Oppose the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 37, 43–45, 47 (Alton Frye ed. 1999). 
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VII of the Charter of the United Nations.66  The United States has itself embraced the 
Charter of the United Nations, so this provision is itself consistent with the law of the 
United States.  That the United States holds a veto at the United Nations Security 
Council should be some reassurance that checks exist to protect the United States.67  
But with calls for war crimes prosecutions against various officials in the United 
States for incidents ranging from the conflicts in Vietnam to the conflict in Iraq, these 
concerns could contribute to the heat over reference to international sources by the 
United States judiciary.   
The proper resolution of this matter, once more, is to be found in the directives 
of U.S. law itself.  In a series of recent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
the place of international law as a limit to the conduct of the executive branch and 
clearly reinforced this ground rule: where the United States has made international law 
part of our domestic legal system, it is binding and enforceable law inside the country, 
even against the executive during a time of armed conflict.  Hence, in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court found fatal defects in the military commissions established during 
the administration of George W. Bush to hold trials for detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
because their structures and procedures violated two sources of U.S. law: the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, signed in 
1949 and codified in U.S. law and ensuring detainees a “regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”68  In his concurring opinion, producing the fifth vote for this view, Justice 
Kennedy reasoned: 
 
The terms of this general standard are yet to be elaborated and 
further defined, but Congress has required compliance with it by 
referring to the “law of war” in §821. The Court correctly 
concludes that the military commission here does not comply with 
this provision. 
 
Common Article 3’s standard of a “regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples,” . . . supports, at the least, a 
uniformity principle. . . .  
                                                 
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13(b), July 12, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
900 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  A nonstate party may also consent to ICC jurisdiction over 
crimes committed within its territory or over its nationals.  Id. at art. 12. 
67 In addition, under the “complementarity” provision, should any case arise from the conduct 
of a United States national, the case is inadmissible before the ICC if the case “is being 
investigated or prosecuted” within the United States or if it “has been investigated” here and 
the State “has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted 
from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.” Id., arts. 17(1)(a), 
17(1)(b). 
68 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 642 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (quoting Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. at 
3318).  
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Absent more concrete statutory guidance, this historical and 
statutory background—which suggests that some practical need 
must justify deviations from the court-martial model—informs the 
understanding of which military courts are “regularly constituted” 
under United States law.69 
 
Explicit Congressional authority would be necessary before the executive could 
bypass these otherwise existing U.S. norms.  No claim of American exceptionalism 
can give the President of the United States unilateral authority to suspend the Geneva 
Conventions;70 for those who care about the capacity of the United States to operate 
apart from developments in international law, the internal domestic structures of the 
United States Constitution—notably, congressional action, subject to presidential veto 
and judicial review—provide the proper avenues. 
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Heated concerns over bypassing domestic legal structures lie behind the specific 
objection to judicial application of what is known as “customary international law.”  
Understanding those concerns can help explain some of the anxieties about judicial 
application of international law.  “Customary international law” can be defined as 
“rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief 
that the law required them to act in that way.”71  Analogous in some ways to the 
common law in the Anglo-American tradition, customary international law—which 
has, according to observers such as the authors of the 1987 Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, long included the international crimes of 
slavery, genocide, and war crimes, as well as the principles of immunity for visiting 
heads of state and the right to humanitarian intervention—thought by some to be 
                                                 
69 Id. at 644. 
70 President Bush had so claimed.  See Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the 
United States to The Vice President, the Sec’y of State, the Sec’y of Def., the Attorney Gen., 
Chief of Staff to the President, Dir. Of Cent. Intelligence, Assistant to the President for Nat’l 
Sec. Affairs & Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, 
TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 105 (2004).  See 
also Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to George W. Bush, President of 
the United States (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 70, at 83.  By their terms, 
common art. III of the Geneva Conventions cannot be repudiated by a signatory during an 
ongoing conflict. GENEVA CONVENTION [NO III] RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
71 SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984). Shabtai 
Rosenne is the former Ambassador of Israel to the United Nations and a leading expert on 
international courts.  See also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xxxi–xlii (2005) (exploring customary 
international law which is not written and which is reflected in state practice and conviction in 
the international community that such practice is required as a matter of law).  
14 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 52 
 
binding, not merely advisory.72  The Restatement itself, written by American law 
professors Louis Henkin, Andreas Lowenfeld, Louis Sohn, and Detlev Vagts, was the 
first effort to assert inclusion of customary international law within the U.S. federal 
law; the prior edition has indicated that its status was an open question.73  In a 
powerful law review article published in 1997, law professors Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith argued against treating customary international law as part of U.S. law, in 
part by showing the absence of any actual judicial opinion or federal statute clearly 
making customary international law part of U.S. law.74 
Two sources of U.S. law make customary international law pertinent.  The first is 
the United Nations Charter—over which the United States played a key role and to 
which our nation subscribes.  The United Nations Charter includes a provision 
directing the International Court of Justice to apply “international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law.”75  Discerned in assessments of general, 
consistent, and widespread practice, this source of norms has governed relations 
among diplomats and rules of war.  The second instance is the Alien Tort Statute, 
enacted as a clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, directing that federal district courts 
“shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the 
circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”76  Ignored or 
neglected for centuries, this provision has recently been deployed as a vehicle for 
international human rights litigation in U.S. federal courts.  In 1980, the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found jurisdiction and held that deliberate torture 
perpetrated under color of official authority “violates universally accepted norms of 
the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties”—
and under that holding, the court ruled that U.S. federal courts could hear cases 
alleging violations of public international law or treaties brought by non-U.S. citizens 
even for conduct occurring outside the United States.77  Ultimately in this case, a 
federal court announced civil damages liability against the former police inspector 
general of Paraguay following the kidnapping and torturing of a 17-year-old son of 
the plaintiff in reaction to his father’s political activities.78 
With this case and its progeny, as well as assertions by some human rights 
advocates that customary international law constrains the executive branch of the 
United States, customary international law has generated controversy.  Why should 
the federal courts address extra-territorial matters?  They impose burdens of work; 
                                                 
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 
(1987).  
73 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A 
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 834–36 (1997). 
74 Id. at 849–70. 
75 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, annex to the U.N. Charter, art. 38(1)(b). 
76 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
77 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
78 Id.  
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they strain the courts’ expertise; and they may unmoor the courts from U.S. law, some 
may object.  These objections may grow in the face of assertions that customary 
international law is evolving to include economic and social rights, to prohibit the 
death penalty, and to regulate discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.79  
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith note that customary international law is now 
articulated not only by actual practices of states but by treaties, resolutions, and views 
of academics.80  They also note how customary international law is growing rapidly 
and addressing topics—such as labor organizing, primary education, and hate 
speech—historically treated only by domestic law.81  Other examples claimed to be 
customary international law include the protection of refugees from being sent back 
to places where their lives or liberties are in jeopardy; immunities for visiting foreign 
heads of state, a right of humanitarian intervention, and prohibitions of slavery, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity, although no one claims that these were 
consistent practices among civilized nations at the time of the founding of the United 
States.  Very fair questions arise, thus, over what counts as consistent practice, who 
decides, and why practices never explicitly endorsed or embraced within the United 
States come to trump rules adopted pursuant to the legislative, judicial, and executive 
practices of U.S. states and the nation.82 
Among the powerful critiques developed by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith is 
one telling argument that portrays dramatic shifts in prevailing understandings of law 
itself within the United States.  They note how for a time customary international law 
was viewed by judges, scholars, and lawyers in this country as part of “general 
common law,” inherited from England or simply the “law of the land” with no 
attention to its source in particular judicial or legislative authority.83  This fit a 
dominant pattern before 1938, when even federal courts could claim to be simply 
finding the general common law of torts or contracts even if that meant contradicting 
what a state law said.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., with disparagement called this 
conception of general common law that of “a transcendental body of law outside of 
any particular State”84 and he instead argued that the common law evolves and 
reflects the interests and times of those articulating it.85  So rather than one universal 
body of law, the common law reflected rules and decisions created by particular 
decision-makers. In its 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme 
Court embraced this view and rejected assertions by federal courts of a power to 
announce general common law; “law in the sense in which courts speak of it today 
does not exist without some definite authority behind it” and hence “[e]xcept in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be 
                                                 
79 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 73, at 818. 
80 Id. at 839. 
81 Id. at 840–42. 
82 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 73, at 838, 857–59, 870–76.  
83 Id. at 822–23. 
84 Black & White Taxicab Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 
518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, Jr., J. dissenting). 
85 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881), available at 
http://pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/10253629?. 
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applied in any case is the law of the State.”86  Scholars gradually recognized that this 
knocked the legs out from under federal court articulations of customary international 
law as well, and that is the argument that Bradley and Goldsmith emphasized.87  
Hence, a federal court cannot apply customary international law “in the absence of 
some domestic authorization to do so.”88 
The U.S. Supreme Court actually had a chance to weigh in on this question—and 
the status of customary international law in federal courts—in a case in which a 
Mexican citizen brought a claim under the Alien Tort Statute asserting false arrest by 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and a Mexican national hired to help the U.S. 
government.  A district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that the Alien Tort Statute created a private cause of action for the Mexican citizen to 
claim a violation of international law due to the arbitrary arrest and detention against 
Jose Francisco Sosa, the Mexican citizen hired to help the U.S. agency.  Defendant 
Sosa argued that U.S. courts have no authority to announce or apply customary 
international law; the plaintiff argued that not only do the federal courts have that 
power but it extended to the instance of false arrest he claimed.  The Supreme Court 
struck a middle course.  Using a close study of evidence about how the framers of the 
Constitution approached international law, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that 
the international common law claims authorized for enforcement in the federal courts 
do not include the claim in this case, and federal courts should not recognize as claims 
violations of international law norms “with less definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar” when the Alien 
Tort Statute was enacted in 1789—such as those against piracy, prohibiting offenses 
against ambassadors, and ensuring safe conduct into or out of a country, whether 
during war, truce, or peacetime.89 
Justice Scalia concurred in the result in the case and concurred in the assessment 
of the historical understanding.  But, in a separate opinion, Justice Scalia asserted that 
recent developments—including the post-Erie treatment of common law—preclude 
the federal courts from recognizing any further developments in international 
common law.  He objected that “the law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus 
of states on any subject” is merely “a 20th-century invention of internationalist law 
professors and human rights advocates” inconsistent with the intent of the 
Constitution’s framers and the democratic project.”90  Nonetheless, even Justice Scalia 
did not dispute that Congress in 1789 authorized federal courts to enforce a small 
number of international norms even without further specific authorization by 
                                                 
86 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938). 
87 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 73, at 827–28, 846–47, 852. 
88 Id. at 853. 
89 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.  The Court noted that the Untied States announced their reception of 
the “law of nations” at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and that included, as 
summarized ultimately by Blackstone, violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.  Id. at 713–14.  One historical inquiry suggests that the framers had 
in mind only safe conducts, not piracy or ambassadorial infringements.  Thomas H. Lee, The 
Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (2006). 
90 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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Congress.91  A six-Justice majority kept the door open to new statements of federal 
common law by federal courts, given two centuries of acknowledgment of 
international law by the United States and the supplemental authority given by 
Congress to permit judicial consideration of torture victim cases.92  But even this 
group of Justices emphasized, as I already mentioned, that “federal courts should not 
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international 
law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar” when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted.93  And in 
addition, cautioned the Court, practical consequences of making a claim available to 
litigants should be considered.94 
Because the subject of customary international law remains one where federal 
courts might exercise some limited and restrained discretion, the topic could generate 
anxieties about federal court consideration of international law.  The historical shifts 
in prevailing understandings of the nature of law’s development and authority—and 
the increasing recognition that judges do not merely discover pre-existing law, they 
help create it—may increase concerns over the sources judges can consult.  The 
Supreme Court has tethered consultation of customary international law to traditions 
and understandings in this country in 1789.  This seems a sound precaution given 
growing evidence that first actors in announcing developments in customary 
international law may themselves retreat or alter their positions over time.95  Where 
there are disagreements across nations about the content of customary international 
law, it seems almost definitional that the topic in question does not yield a norm of 
such general practice and acceptance as to rise to the level of customary international 
law. 
In exploring the sources of concern over judicial consultation of foreign and 
international law, I have suggested worries about customary international law, risks to 
America given politically motivated uses of law, and fears of being taken over or 
losing control.  To be frank, those who raise these concerns are likely more worried 
about what others will do than about themselves.  But I hope that the recent history I 
have recounted gives assurance that the Supreme Court has affirmed rigorous 
adherence to American law and traditions when the Justices turn to foreign or 
international law and has emphasized restraint even then. 
                                                 
91 Id. at 728–30 (discussing Scalia, J. concurring opinion and referring back to sections I and II, 
endorsed by Justice Scalia).  
92 Id. at 724-25. 
93 Id. at 732. 
94 Id. at 732-33. 
95 See, e.g., Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Regulating Role of the Political 
Branches in the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 47-52 (Harvard Law School Faculty 
Workshop, Working Paper, 2010) (discussing developments in universal jurisdiction) (on file 
with Harvard International Law Journal). 
18 Harvard International Law Journal Online / Vol. 52 
 
III. RECLAIMING THE CHANCE TO LEARN 
Those who object to references to foreign or international law even when U.S. 
law directs attention to these sources run risks of inciting anxieties and fears, as the 
death threats to Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor indicate.  There are other costs that 
spread beyond judges and courts.    
Neglecting developments in international and comparative law could vitiate the 
vitality, nimbleness, and effectiveness of American law or simply leave us without the 
best tools and insights as we design and run institutions, pass legislation, and work to 
govern ourselves.  
Consider two examples of extra-domestic—and extra-judicial—learning that 
would be helpful; the absence of which would be a loss. 
First, regulators, citizens, and indeed anyone interested in governance could learn 
about emerging forms of what is called “soft law” in the context of the European 
Union.  Unlike government-issued rules that carry sanctions, enforceable by courts or 
agencies, soft law includes voluntary standards that depend on consensual action, and 
which are embraced by private actors and also informal institutions.96  Soft law can 
proceed through private and voluntary codes, certification and labeling systems, or 
transparency obligations placed on government where the disclosure of information 
deters misconduct and empowers observers to monitor government action.97  And, as 
summarized by John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock, soft law offers the advantages of 
“timely action when governments are stalemated; bottom-up initiatives that bring 
additional legitimacy, expertise, and other resources for making and enforcing new 
norms and standards; and an effective means for direct civil society participation in 
global governance.”98  In trade, labor relations, environmental protection, and other 
fields, these techniques can elicit changes in behavior, attract cooperation, and also at 
times work as a precursor to or substitute for “hard law” with sanctions.  These kinds 
of devices pervade international law and also identify tools that are often useful within 
a country, state, or town.99 
Of course, we use some of these devices already, both domestically and in our 
international ties.  But learning about developments elsewhere could offer new tools 
and refinements even while helping us clarify how law works.  It is easy to emphasize 
that foreign and international legal materials—analogous to soft law--represent no 
                                                 
96 See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable 
Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, 
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 3, 9 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 
2004); MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT 12 (2008). 
97 See Kirton & Trebilcock, supra note 96, at 10. 
98 Id. at 5. 
99 See Gerda Falkner, et al., Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the 
Member States 179–80 (2005); Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in Routledge Handbook of 
International Law 68 (David Armstrong ed., 2009); David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark 
Nance, ‘Soft Law’, ‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration, in Law and New Governance in the EU and 
US 65, 69 (Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). 
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binding force within the United States, except where American law itself endorses, 
incorporates, or calls for consultation of international or foreign law. Nonbinding 
authorities, including law reviews, scholarly treatises, and judgments of sister circuit 
courts are often and widely consulted.  Especially in issues of first impression or 
evolving legal norms, consultation of nonbinding sources can be instructive and 
clarifying though never binding.  
A second topic offering potentially useful learning to lawyers, judges, and citizens 
in the United States is the International Criminal Court.  It is the institutional design 
that offers instruction here.  Any worries about prosecutions of United States citizens 
are not only unwarranted but they also risk obscuring fascinating features of that 
experiment that might offer intriguing ideas for domestic work here.  Chief among 
them is the idea of complementarity, built into the Court: the Court defers to actions 
within nations and in fact loses the ability to proceed with a case if the case “is being 
investigated or prosecuted” within a country having jurisdiction over it or even if it 
“has been investigated” here and the State “has decided not to prosecute the person 
concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute.”100  This device has several consequences.  It puts power in 
the hands of individual nations to avoid ICC action—if only the individual nation 
takes up the investigation of the matter otherwise headed to the ICC.  It thereby 
creates a device for limiting the ICC’s business and power.  It also creates an incentive 
for increasing capacity and political will in individual nations for enforcing the norms 
against genocide and crimes against humanity.  It preserves decentralization and 
national sovereignty in ways that might offer models on some matters for the 
relationships between the national and state governments within the United States, 
between Indian Tribes and the United States, between government and 
nongovernmental entities, or in other instances where multiple agents may have an 
interest in a given matter.  A dean might try this with students, or a parent might even 
try this with a child—I’ll check into your conduct unless you do so and do so credibly.   
The complementarity device of the ICC is simply one example of international 
legal materials offering potential instruction to people in the United States—not 
because it is our law but because it offers an approach to issues of institutional design 
that we often face.  Moreover, we as Americans who contributed so much to modern 
international law remain involved in it.  Even Americans who report skepticism about 
the efficiency of the UN respond very positively to the recommendations of the 
UN.101 
One last thought: we might actually learn something from an instance about 
which I think there is considerable pride in this country.  Our Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, is a legal moment about which our 
nation is justifiably proud.  However partial and limited is the fulfillment of its 
ultimate vision of racial integration, Brown’s rejection of “separate but equal” schools 
spurred the end of segregation in retail stores, theaters, swimming pools, and 
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101 Katerina Linos, How International Norms Shape Voter Choices, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
10, 11 (forthcoming 2010). 
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employment, though often only after a struggle and legislative or litigated reforms.102  
The steps from Jim Crow segregation to the election of President Barack Obama were 
many and nonlinear, but Brown played a role in mobilizing changes in ideas as well as 
in practices and opportunities.  Brown’s influence inside schools but outside of the 
context of race has profoundly altered the discussions and treatment of gender, 
disability, language, ethnicity, and national origin, with further changes in the way 
educational and life opportunities of students are affected by their sexual orientation, 
religion, economic class, or status as Native Hawai’ians or Native Americans.103  Well 
beyond schooling, Brown and the efforts surrounding it have created the model for 
social and legal reforms in the United States on behalf of girls and women, persons 
with disabilities, members of religious minorities, and advocates for economic justice, 
environmental protection, and other issues.104 
As I researched my new book on Brown’s influence,105 I was struck by how much 
our landmark case and the struggle behind it have served as an evocative reference 
point for advocates pursuing equal opportunity and social change around the world.  
Advocates in Northern Ireland, South Africa, India, and Eastern Europe have pointed 
to Brown in their own efforts to use law to overcome social division within educational 
systems and even in initiatives addressing social hierarchy and exclusion without 
connection to race or education.13  Although this international perspective echoes 
Brown’s mixed legacy in actually realizing equal opportunity in practice, looking across 
the world, it is undeniable that Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for a unanimous 
Supreme Court has become a powerful resource for change agents everywhere. 
Brown v. Board of Education has played a prominent role in efforts both to combat 
this segregated education system and to transition away from the apartheid regime 
more generally.  In 1958, Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Macmillian cited Brown 
while critiquing apartheid in an address to South Africa’s Parliament.106  During the 
1980s, two lawyers who worked closely with Thurgood Marshall on Brown v. Board of 
Education assisted lawyers in South Africa to develop judicial strategies to terminate 
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apartheid.107  After the fall of apartheid and the creation of a new constitutional 
regime, the South African Constitutional Court has repeatedly cited Brown v. Board of 
Education in cases.   For the case of In re The School Education Bill of 1995, the Court 
relied on Brown in discussing the important role of education in developing and 
maintaining a democratic society, but reflected the history of South Africa and the 
global human rights movement in rejecting the claim that the government had a 
constitutional duty to establish or fund Afrikaans schools while recognizing the right 
of private groups to maintain such schools.108  One author argues that the tensions 
over school desegregation and affirmative action in the United States influenced 
drafters of the South African Constitution in their decision to shield remedial uses of 
racial categories from constitutional challenge.109 
And last October, the South African Constitutional Court worked to 
accommodate language rights while tackling ongoing exclusion of black South 
Africans from educational opportunities.  An Afrikaans-language school had extra 
spaces and black South Africans wanted access, but the school asserted a right to 
instruct only in Afrikaans.  The Constitutional Court acknowledged the constitutional 
right to be taught in an official language of one’s choice but directed the school’s own 
governing body to reassess its language policy and provide sufficient spaces for 
English learners for the coming school year.110  Affirming equality as respect for the 
language of one’s own choice in this case involved protecting a minority language of 
the historically privileged group;111 the Court then expressly pointed to the 
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Constitutional design to transform public education and South African society by 
addressing unequal access to educational resources.112   
In Eastern Europe, the European Roma Rights Center in Budapest joined with 
others, including Czech attorney David Strupek, in 2000 to challenge student 
placement practices in the Czech Republic, where a disproportionately large number 
of Roma children were being placed in schools for students with mental or learning 
disabilities rather than mainstream schools.113  Lawyers and others working on behalf 
of the Roma students explicitly discussed Brown and the movement surrounding it.114  
They initiated a case known as D.H. as the centerpiece of the Roma rights 
movement’s litigation strategy,115 which was designed to pursue cases that could 
change existing practices “through liberal and far-reaching judicial interpretation, as 
well as to trigger comprehensive reform of legislation.”116  D.H.—like the cases 
combined into Brown—focused on systematic discrimination and mindsets 
perpetuating second-class status for an entire group of people.  Lawyers from the 
United States, Great Britain, and many European nations contributed to the advocacy 
strategy and commentary about it.117  
And the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of the Roma applicants 
by a vote of thirteen to four.118  Finding the special schools offered an often inferior 
curriculum as well as diminished educational and employment prospects,119 and 
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finding that the placement in special schools likely increased stigma for Roma 
children, the Grand Chamber quoted, with approval, the European Commissioner for 
Human Rights, who said that “segregated education denies both the Roma and non-
Roma children the chance to know each other and to learn to live as equal citizens.”120  
The Grand Chamber cited research from the United States about racial inequity in 
special education,121 noting the negative effects of early tracking.122  It located its 
judgment in the context of sources from the Council of Europe,123 including 
European Community law and practice concerning indirect discrimination and 
disparate impact of tests on minority populations;124 United Nations materials;125 and 
a set of “other sources,” including the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, allowing evidence of the disparate racial impact of a test as 
evidence of racial discrimination.126  The European Court ultimately ruled that 
demonstration of invidious intention was not necessary to show a pattern of 
separation and disadvantage for children from one background and in this dimension, 
struck out on a path quite different from the constitutional interpretation of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which demands proof of intentional discrimination to establish a 
violation of the U.S. Constitution. 
One more echo of Brown can be heard in Northern Ireland which has long been 
divided between “controlled” schools—which are government run, have Protestant 
roots, and serve about 50 percent of the students—and “managed” schools, which are 
maintained by Catholic organizations and educate about 45 percent of the children.  
Historically, these separate school systems have taught contrasting versions of 
regional history and as a result have not reduced but have contributed to the tensions 
and violence of “the Troubles,” which begin in the 1960s and have continued even 
after the Belfast agreement of 1998.  In the 1980s, a group of parents started the 
Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education as a voluntary organization to 
develop schools that would bring together students from the two communities.  With 
government aid, the Council allows parents to launch new, integrated schools; the 
Council also developed a procedure by which parents could vote to convert an 
existing school into an integrated school.127  These schools give general instruction in 
Christianity rather than strict instruction in Protestantism or Catholicism.128  The 
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Department of Education incorporates such schools only after they show sufficient 
enrollment and a waiting list for preschool.129  
By 2009, the Council had produced, with aid from English charitable trusts, 
nineteen integrated nursery schools, forty-one integrated primary schools, and twenty 
integrated second-level colleges—showing impressive growth, but reaching barely five 
percent of the population.130  Across the country, integrated schools have generated 
considerable parental demand, with long waiting lists.  Perhaps by having a strategy of 
integrating schools only with supportive parents and starting such schools on a small 
scale, the project ensured from the start a base of support rather than conflict—even 
before the larger community conflict quieted down. 
After a decade of relative peace following a process producing political power-
sharing, Northern Ireland experienced a spike in intergroup violence in March 2009.  
The murder of a Northern Irish police officer in Ulster occurred two days after the 
murders of two British soldiers, and a resurgence of acts of terror committed by 
dissident groups wracked the region.131  Johann Hari, a British journalist, suggested 
“Northern Ireland needs its own version of Brown v. Board of Education.”132  Citing a 
six-year study by researchers at Queen’s University, Hari noted that individuals who 
attended the integrated schools were “significantly more likely” to oppose 
sectarianism, had more friends across the divide, and identified as “Northern Irish” 
rather than as “British” or “Irish.”133  Stressing that “[i]t’s difficult to caricature people 
you’ve known since you were a child: great sweeping hatreds are dissolved by the grey 
complexity of individual human beings,” Hari marveled that “82 percent reported that 
they personally support the idea of integrated schooling, and 55 percent of parents say 
the only reason their kids don’t go to an integrated school is because” they cannot get 
into one.134  And taking one more page from U.S. history, this British journalist 
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concluded: “Who knows—a hefty push for school integration could yield, in a few 
decades, a Northern Irish Obama, carrying both sides in his veins.”135  
There might even be lessons to take back to the United States about the potential 
influence of a parent-based movement for integration.  But Brown itself, as it turns 
out, even before the U.S. Supreme Court, reflected important influence from 
comparative and international concerns.  The Swedish scholar Gunner Myrdal’s 
American Dilemma, with its searing indictment of America’s treatment of the “Negro,” 
became a key citation in the Court’s famous footnote 11.136  Initially, President 
Eisenhower showed no sympathy for the school integration project and expressed 
suspicion that the United Nations and international economic and social rights 
activists were betraying socialist or even communist leanings in supporting the 
brief.137  But as the United States tried to position itself as a leader in human rights 
and supporter of the United Nations, the Cold War orientation of Eisenhower’s 
Republican administration gave rise to interest in ending official segregation, 
lynchings, and cross burnings in order to elevate the American image internationally.  
The Department of Justice collaborated with the State Department on an amicus brief 
that argued that ending racially segregated schools could terminate the Soviet critique 
of the tolerance of racial abuses by the U.S. system of government and thereby help 
combat global communism.138  Ending segregation emerged as part of a strategy to 
secure more influence than the Soviet Union over the “Third World.”  African-
American civil rights leader and journalist Roger Wilkins later recalled that ending 
official segregation became urgent as black ambassadors started to visit Washington, 
D.C. and the United Nations in New York City.139 
At our best, we have learned from a global perspective; my small and I hope not 
too controversial thought is: judges and lawyers, citizens and residents of this country 
can and should continue to learn from global perspectives in order to advance the 
best version of ourselves.  
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